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Taxation of Asset Income
in the Presence of a World Securities Market
Roger H. Gordon
Hal R. Varian
Whenever a country is large enough to be able to affect the international price of a commodity
that it trades in, then it will be tempted to set its policy so as to take advantage of this market
power, at least so long as it can ignore any threat of retaliation by other countries. This observation
forms the basis for a variety of results in the trade literature. For example, when a country can affect
the price of its exported goods, then it will find tariffs or direct restrictions on exports attractive.1
Similarly, if a country is a net demander (supplier) of capital, and faces a nonhorizontal supply
(demand) curve, then it may attempt to restrict its net demand (supply).2
The objective of this paper is to explore characteristics of government tax policy and equilibrium
resource allocation when countries are not price-takers in the international market for financial
securities. Due to risk aversion, the foreign demand for domestic securities should be downward
sloping - foreign investors need more attractive terms to induce them to concentrate their portfolios
further in any one security.3 Similarly, the supply curve of foreign securities should be upward
sloping. The above observations suggest that each country would face the incentive to reduce both
its net supply of domestic securities to foreigners and its net demand for foreign securities. When
each country sets its policy accordingly, the net result will be restricted international trade in
financial securities.
Since governments have much more market power than any one firm, it is not surprising that at
least large countries should have an incentive to restrict international trade in financial securities.
However, we show that each country continues to have market power over the price of the equity
of domestic firms even as the number of countries becomes large, so that even small countries have
the incentive to restrict foreign ownership of domestic equity. In contrast, only large countries have
an incentive to restrict domestic ownership of foreign equity, or to restrict net capital flows.
This intervention can take many forms. Direct controls on the outflow of capital is obviously one
device. To restrict foreign ownership of domestic equity, a dividend withholding tax on dividends
sent to foreigners, or a dividend credit available only to domestic residents, can be used.4 In
addition a corporate tax can be used to restrict the total supply of equity in the domestic firms.
One way to restrict inflows of capital is to impose extra fees on multinational entrants to a country.
Each of these policies is commonly observed, and each seems to us to be difficult to explain on
other grounds.
Our results also provide one possible explanation for two empirical puzzles. The first is why
individual portfolios are so highly concentrated in domestic securities. From a direct application
of standard results in finance, one would expect investors to hold a fraction of the world portfolio
We would like to thank participants in a seminar at N.B.E.R., and especially Richard Clarida, for comments on
a previous draft. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of N.B.E.R.
1 The most obvious example of such export restrictions is OPEC.
2 See, for example, Jones(1967), Gehrels(1971), Feldstein-Hartman(1979), or Hartman(1985ab), for further dis-
cussion. When a country has market power in both the capital market and the commodity market, as in Jones and
Gehrels, interaction effects add complications.
3 Helpman-Razin(1978,pp. 141-2) noted in this setting the possible gains from government intervention.
4See Booth(1987) for estimates of the degree to which the dividend tax credit concentrates ownership of Canadian
securities among Canadian investors.
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of risky securities.5 Our model implies that governments have an incentive to induce investors to
concentrate their portfolios in domestic equity.
The second puzzle, posed by Feldstein-Horioka(1980), is why net capital flows between countries
are so small. Empirically, a country's savings and investment rates are very closely tied, even though
these rates differ dramatically across countries. Our model implies that, at least in large countries,
governments have an incentive to restrict net capital flows, to limit adverse movements in the
interest rate.
Our analysis of optimal government policy, when a country is not a price-taker in the financial
markets, is related to various aspects of the papers by Stiglitz(1972), Jensen-Long(1972), Ekern-
Wilson(1974) and Leland(1974), which examine the optimal investment behavior of a firm which is
not a price-taker in the financial market. We assume that asset prices satisfy the CAPM equation,
as did Stiglitz and Jensen-Long. However, we also assume that the government acts in the best
interests of its citizens, which relates more closely to the work by Ekern-Wilson and Leland, in
which firms are assumed to act in the best interests of their shareholders.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic assump-
tions of our model, and then derive the characteristics of the market equilibrium in the face of
arbitrary tax policy in each country. In section 2, we examine the Nash equilibrium for government
policy when each government chooses its tax rates to maximize the welfare of its citizens, taking as
given the tax policies of other governments. Since many complicated interaction effects can arise in
general, we develop in this section a variety of special cases. In section 3, we provide a discussion
of the main results, while these results are summarized in section 4.
1. Characteristics of the model
Behavior of individual consumers and individual firms
Our economy consists of N different countries, and operates for two periods. In each country n,
there are In identical individuals and Mn identical firms. There is only one good in the economy,
which is tradeable, which can be used in the first period for either consumption or investment, and
which is entirely consumed in the second period.s
Each firm f in country n invests some amount of capital, Kfa,in the first period and produces
a stochastic amount of output, OnFn(Kf ), in the second period. Here, Fn is a nonstochastic
(weakly) concave function, and 9, is a normally distributed random variable with mean O,. The
original capital is assumed to depreciate completely. This output, net of depreciation, is subject to
a corporate income tax at rate Tn, but the resulting revenue is assumed to be returned to the firm
in a lump-sum, Lf1 , thereby avoiding any income effects from the tax. Therefore the firm's owners
receive R1f =O6Fn - rn(OnFn - K 1f) + L fn = O F, in the second period.
The firm in the first period "goes public" and sells shares of ownership in this return to individual
investors. Denote the market value of these shares by V1 , where Vf, implicitly depends on the
amount of capital Kf, that the firm promises to acquire. The initial owners of the firm when it
goes public then divide the residual V ,~ - Kg among themselves. Since all firms in country n
are identical, we let V, = MVf, denote their aggregate market value, K, = M.Kf. denote their
aggregate investment, and R, = MnRfn denote their aggregate return.
5 Adler-Dumas(1983) show empirically that, even taking exchange rate risk into account, the mean-variance effi-
cient portfolio for an investor can be approximated by a combination of nominally risk-free domestic bonds and a
share of the world portfolio in equity.
6 We therefore assume purchasing power parity. For a related discussion of use of government policy to take
advantage of market power with respect to exchange rates, see Gordon(1985).
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Before going public, each firm must decide how much capital it will promise to acquire. We
assume that in doing so the firm maximizes the value of the residual Vf, - K f going to its initial
owners.
Each individual i in country n starts in the first period with wealth Win and an initial ownership
share in in the firms in each country m. He must then decide how to divide these initial assets
between first-period consumption, C n, final ownership shares, s%, and riskless bonds, Bin. Riskless
bonds pay a real interest rate r, and the net supply of bonds in the world economy is zero. The
individual decides on this division of his wealth subject to the budget constraint
Cs +iB+ Z8 V =Win + s(Vm - Km). (1)
m m
In the second period, he receives the income from his investments. However, any interest income
is subject to tax at rate tn,7 while any income from firms in country m is subject to tax at rate
gmn.8 The resulting tax revenue is assumed to be returned to the individual by a lump sum transfer,
Tin, so that there are no income effects from the taxes, only price effects. Therefore, consumption
in the second period, C?, must satisfy
Ctn = (1 + r(1 - tn))Bin + E st(Rm - gmn(R. - Vm)) + T;
= (1+ r)Bin + E s Rm (2)
M
Individuals choose values for C n and the various s!, allowing Bin to adjust according to the
budget constraint, so as to maximize the utility function
U(C n, Cn)= -e-buC.c - pnEe-bnCc
= -e-bnc ,-_pe-b (EC?.-(bn/2)var(Cn)) (3)
IHere b, is the constant absolute risk aversion parameter, pn is a time preference parameter, and E is
an expectations operator. The second line of equation (3) follows since C n is distributed normally.
Assuming that the utility function has constant absolute risk aversion is obviously restrictive, but
simplifies the following discussion significantly by allowing us to use mean-variance analysis with a
constant rade-off between mean and variance.
The resulting first order conditions, after some simplification, can be expressed as
e-c- = p, (1 + r(1 - tn))Ee-b.C -, and (4a)
ERm = (1 + amnr) Vm + bncov(Rm, Cxn), (4b)
where, amn = (1 - tn)/(1 - gmn). Equation (4b) corresponds closely to the standard CAPM
equation with taxes, as appears for example in Brennan(1970) or Gordon-Bradford(1980).
7 For simplicity, we assume that real and not nominal interest is taxable. If nominal interest were taxable at
different rates in different countries, there must be differences in the after-tax return on different bonds in equilibrium,
creating arbitrage possibilities. No such possibilities exist when real interest is taxable. These arbitrage possibilities
could also have been avoided by making all exchange rate gains or losses fully taxable. See Gordon(1986) for further
discussion.
8Existing tax structures do not normally differentiate directly between income from foreign and domestic secu-
rities. However, a number of countries impose a dividend withholding tax on dividends from domestic firms paid
to foreigners. If Rmn is defined to equal what foreigners receive on equity, then a withholding tax is equivalent to a
subsidy on ownership of domestic equity. Similarly, a number of countries have a dividend credit which is available
only to domestic residents on equity of domestic firms. The ability of governments to differentiate between income
from different foreign countries is assumed to simplify the notation in the following discussion.
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Characteristics of the competitive equilibrium in the world economy
The world economy is in equilibrium when each individual is maximizing utility given market prices,
so equations (4a-b) are satisfied, when each firm has chosen that capital stock which maximizes
the value of its residual claim, and when supply equals demand for each security. One useful
characteristic of the resulting equilibrium can be derived by aggregating the equations (4b) across
individuals for each security. In particular, if we divide equations (4b) for each individual by b,
and sum across individuals, we get
ERm Z(In/bn) = [Z(In/bn) + r j((amnIn/bn)] Vm + COV(Rm, n I C)h). (5a)
nIn n j
This equation can be re-expressed, using equation (2), as
ERm = (1+ amr)Vm + Bcov(Rm, R). (5b)
Here B 1/(En(In/bn)) provides a measure of the degree of risk aversion of the market as a
whole, R En R, measures the return on the market portfolio, and am B En(amnIn/bn) is a
weighted average of the tax parameters faced by each individual in the economy, weighted by the
inverse of each individual's degree of risk aversion, bn. This equation is a simple generalization of
the standard CAPM market line in a setting with taxes.
Each firm f in each country n chooses its capital stock to maximize the value of V-n - K n,
which implies that it chooses Kfn such that OV fn/OKf = 1. The firm uses equation (5b) to
forecast the impact of changes in its capital stock on its market value. We assume that the firm
is small enough that in doing so it takes am, r, B, and the return on the market portfolio, R, as
given. Its optimal capital stock can therefore be characterized implicitly by
(1 - rn)Fine + rn = (1 + anr) + Bcov((l - rn)F'9,,R). (6a)
This expression can be simplified using equation (5b) to yield
F'Vn rn (_ar= 1 + (6b)
Fn 1-rnl 1+anr
The equation characterizing the equilibrium market interest rate can be derived in a similar
fashion. Equation (4a) implies that
(1/bn)ln[pn(1 + (1 - tn)r)] = ECn - (bn/2)varCfn - Cin. (7a)
But if we multiply each of the equations (4b) by sT and sum over m, we find that
bnvarCin = EZsiRm - Zs (1 + amnr)Vm. (7b)
m m
Substituting equation (7Tb) into equation (7a), summing over all individuals, and using the budget
constraints describing Cjn and Cin, we find that
S(In/bn)ln[pn(1 + (1 - tn)r)] = ~ [ERm + Vm(1 + a~mr)] - Z(nWin - .), (8)
where a*, = Zn sgInamn represents the simple average of all the ormn for each security, in this
equation, the first term on the right-hand side simply measures the certainty equivalent amount of
consumption in the second period while the second term measures first-period consumption.
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2. Characteristics of the Nash equilibrium for government tax policies
While we have assumed that no individual and no firm is large enough to have any market
power, each government could well be large enough to affect market prices through its tax policy.
We assume that each government sets its tax rates so as to maximize the expected utility of
its residents, taking into account any effect of its decisions on market prices. When a government
considers what will happen to market prices, we assume that it takes as given the tax rates chosen by
other governments, that it assumes all individuals and firms will continue to behave competitively,
and that market prices will adjust so that all markets continue to clear. Other more complicated
games between governments could be imagined, but this description of policy formulation seems to
us to be reasonable.
Since taxes distort the allocation of resources, and any tax revenue is simply returned in a
lump-sum fashion to whomever paid it, taxes will seem attractive only if they can be used to aid
residents at the expense of nonresidents through favorable changes in market prices. If a government
assumes that market prices will continue to satisfy equation (5b), and that the parameters am, B,
r, and R, will all remain unaffected by any change in its own tax policy, then it follows quickly
that the optimal tax rates are all zero. Without any taxes, residents in the country will choose
that allocation which maximizes their utility given these assumptions about market prices, and
competitive firms will act in the best interests of their shareholders under these assumptions.
However, when the government in some country n uses its tax policy to change the domestic use
of real resources, the various market prices must adjust so that individuals and firms in the other
countries are just willing to accept the implied change in the resources available to them. Using
the model described in section 1, we can calculate the equilibrium market prices for any given use
of resources in country n by aggregating the first-order conditions (4a-b) across all nonresidents,
holding fixed the resource use in country n. Following the same procedure that we used above,
when we aggregated equation (4b) over all nonresidents, we find that
ERm = (1 + am,_nr)Vm + B-ncov(Rm, R - InCL). (9a)
IIere, am,-n = [Epn(Ip/bp)amp]/[Epn(I/bp)] is a weighted average of the individual tax pa-
rameters, as before, but now averaged over all the nonresidents, while B-n = 1/[E, (I,/b,)] is
the aggregate risk aversion parameter for the nonresidents. Note also that the appropriate market
portfolio now equals the portfolio held by nonresidents. Similarly, if we aggregate equation (4a)
over nonresidents, we find that
j(I,/b,)ln[p,(1+(1 - t,)r] - _ZERm(1 - Ins) + (1 + r)InBin
pi n m
1 - [1 + amr -Inst(1+amr)]Vm  IC,=0. (9b)
M pon
When a government considers changing domestic real decisions, K, C1, and the s , through
its choice of tax rates, r1, ta, and the 9mn, it should therefore use equations (9a-b) to forecast
how market prices change. In doing so, it should also take into account how foreign firms revise
their investment rates in response to changes in market prices, as described by equations (6b).
The resulting implications for government policy are sufficiently complicated, however, that we will
focus on a variety of special cases to shed light on what should happen in the general case.
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Market interest rates and foreign investment assumed fixed
We begin by assuming that each government takes as given the market interest rate, r, and the
amounts of capital, Km, invested in the other countries, but otherwise uses equation (9a) to forecast
the effects of its policies on asset values, Vm. The government in each country n therefore chooses
the tax rates tn, gm,, and r, to maximize the expected utility of its residents, E > U(C1n, Ctn),
taking into account what equation (9a) implies about asset prices, V. Rather than solving for the
optimal tax rates directly, however, it is more convenient to solve for the optimal values of Cfi,
K 1 n, and the sT, and then infer from these the implied values of the optimal tax rates.
Since the government takes the market interest rate as given, and so has no market power in
the world bond market, it has no incentive to change the decisions residents make about how much
to borrow or lend. Therefore, the desired tax rate on interest income, in, is zero. To show this, we
differentiate expected utility with respect to C! , giving the first-order condition"
e-bnCi = pn(1 + r)EebC ". (10)
Comparing equations (4a) and (10), we find that individuals make the socially optimal decisions
about C! only if to = 0.
Equation (9a) does imply, however, that equity purchases by residents of country n will have
an effect on asset prices. Since residents do not take these effects into account, the desired tax
treatment of equity income will be more complicated. The first-order condition with respect to the
government's implicit choice of sg is
ER. = (1 + r)Vm + (1+ r)InZ(s' - 3)(4V/6s )+ bcov(Rm, Cfn). (11)
P
Here we find that to the extent that changing sT raises the price of an asset for which the country
is a net demander (sin > s n), the opportunity cost of buying a share in that asset, as measured
by the right-hand side of equation (11), is increased. (A similar effect holds if the country is a
net supplier of an asset.) Since individual portfolio choices are characterized by equations (4b),
the government can induce individuals to make optimal portfolio choices by enacting tax rates on
equity income from each asset such that
(amn - 1)rVm = (1 + r)I, Z('s - g )(OV,/s!). (12)
P
To see what happens to asset prices when domestic equity purchases change, we can differentiate
equations (9a) with respect to s! and find that
8V,/8sg = B_ cov(R,, Rm)/(1 + ap,,nr). (13)
When country n purchases more of asset m, leaving less of this asset for nonresidents, the prices
of those assets which are substitutes (have returns which covary positively with that on asset mn)
go up, and conversely.
9 These assumptions correspond to those used by Stiglitz(1972) and Jensen-Long(1972) in analyzing the behavior
of a firm which is not a price-taker in the securities market.
10 Under our assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, any change in savings due to a change in C! is en tirely
allocated to B;,, so there is no resulting change in any of the Vm.
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Therefore, the government should iscourage (encourage) ownership of any asset which is both
a substitute (complement) for assets which the country demands on net and a complement (substi-
tute) for assets which the country supplies on net. Government policy is in equilibrium when each
country is simultaneously setting its tax policy according to equation (12).
In order to shed further light on the characteristics of this Nash equilibrium in government tax
policy, we consider a special case in some detail. In particular, assume that each country is identical
in all respects except that the random return on each country's technology is different. Assume,
though, that var(Rm) = a for all m, and that cov(Rm, R,) = 0 for all m 4n.1 In addition,
assume that initially the equity in each country's firms is entirely owned by domestic residents, so
that s = 0 for m # n.
Given this symmetry, we can describe a country's tax policy by the tax parameter used on
income from the domestic security, ad, and the tax parameter used on any income from foreign
securities, af. Similarly, we can let sd represent the fraction of each firm owned domestically, and
sf represent the fraction owned by investors in each foreign country. Since all shares must be
owned, we know that 1 - sd = (N - 1)sj. Other variables do not vary by country or by asset, so
we drop subscripts unless they are needed for clarification.
Under these assumptions, the set of equations (12) describing equilibrium tax policy become
(ad- 1)rV = -(1 - sd)aB [,1+r) and (14a)
(1+ afr)[ (1+r)(
(af - 1)rV = sB I , (146)
i(1+a*r)j
where a* = [(N - 2)af + ad]/(N - 1) is a weighted average of the two tax parameters. Let Gd and
Gf equal the right-hand sides of equations (14a) and (14b) respectively, and so represent the size
of the optimal tax distortion. It follows by inspection that G1 > 0 and Gd < 0.
Given our assumptions, the individual's first-order condition for holdings of the domestic security
becomes ER = (1 + r)V + Gd + b(sd/I)a, implying that
sa = I(ER - (1 + r)V - Gd)/(ba). (15a)
Similarly, the first-order conditions also imply that
sf = I(ER- (1 + r)V - G)/(ba). (15b)
In equilibrium, sd + (N - 1)sf = 1. Substituting the above expressions for sd and sf into this
market clearing condition, we find that the equilibrium asset prices must satisfy
ER=(1+r)V+Ba+(Gd+(N-1)Gf)/N. (16)
It follows easily from equations (14a) and (14b) that this last term is positive, implying that on
net the optimal tax policy will raise the required rate of return on equity, taking into account both
domestic subsidies to ownership and foreign taxes.
Substituting this condition for the market clearing price into equations (15ab), we find that
1 N - 1(G - Gd)I
sd = -+ N, and (15a')
11 This simplifying assumption of independent shocks across countries, while extreme, is not that inconsistent with
the data as reported in Adler-Dumas(1983). The results being derived depend almost entirely on the size of the





Given the symmetry between countries in this example, without taxes investors in each country
would own the fraction (1/N) of each security. Here, we confirm that in equilibrium with optimal
taxes, investors will tend to specialize in the domestic security, since Gf - Gd > 0.
We can then substitute these asset demand equations (15a') and (15b') into equations (14ab)
to solve for Gf and Gd in terms of the exogenous parameters of the model. While in general
the resulting expressions are a bit messy, if we make the simplifying approximation that (1 +
r)/(1 + a*r) e (1 + r)/(1 + afr) a 1,12 then it is easy to confirm that G1 ~ Ba/(N +1), while
Gd : -Ba(N -1)/(N+1). Substituting into equations (15a') and (156'), we find that with optimal
taxes
1 (N - 1)





.s N1 - 151sy ~ - 1 -.(15d)
Therefore, optimal taxes can almost double the equilibrium share of any security owned by domestic
investors for large values of N. As N gets larger, the optimal value of Gd increases in absolute
value, though the optimal value of Gf declines towards zero. Each country remains large relative to
the market for its own security, due to the fact that each country's security provides a unique source
of diversification, though each country becomes small relative to the market for foreign securities
as the number of countries increases.
In contrast to this example, if we assume instead that each country's initial ownership share
in each technology also equals its desired final ownership share, so that = s nfor all m, then
equation (12) shows that the optimal value of o,,, equals one for all m - no trade takes place
in securities, so there is no gain from changing the price of any security. This setting is the one
examined by Ekern-Wilson(1974) and Leland(1974) when investigating the investment behavior of
firms. In general, our results show that the government faces an incentive to restrict international
trade in securities. But if no trade would take place anyway, no intervention is needed to restrict
trade further. The greater the trade that would take place without intervention, the larger are the
optimal tax rates (in absolute value).
Given its use of taxes to distort individual portfolio decisions, the government will also find it
desirable to distort the capital investment decisions of domestic firms. While domestic residents
are subsidized to own domestic capital, given the amount invested, the capital investment decision
should be made taking into account the full cost ignoring the subsidy. Therefore, to the extent
that ownership is subsidized, the government should impose a corporate tax to offset this subsidy.
Formally, the first-order condition with respect to Kj, equals
(1 + r) s, + (sg - s-)T = , (ER - bncov(Rn, C.)). (15e)
Using equation (9a) to calculate the changes in asset prices, and simplifying using equations (Alb)
and (12), finally gives
FjV, _ (1+r)I____"_(15f)
12 These approximations will be very good for large N.
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Comparing this equation with equation (6b), we find that the optimal value of the corporate tax
rate is characterized by
1 + anr/(1 - rn) (1+ r)Inn
. (16a)
1 + amr (1 + r)Insin - r(1 - ann)
Since an, < 1, we find that r, > 0. Therefore, capital investment is discouraged not only because
an > 1 but also because of a supplementary corporate tax. Since 1 - ann remains positive even as
N grows without bound, we conclude that r, will also remain positive in the limit.
If Insn = 1, so that domestic firms are entirely owned domestically, the interpretation of the
optimal value of rn is straight-forward, since equations (4b) and (15f) together imply that
F1#n = (1-+ r) + bncov(Fn6n,Cn). (16b)
Tax policy has been designed so that the optimal amount of the domestic lottery, 6n, has been
sold to foreigners. Any more of this lottery would be absorbed by domestic residents. As equation
(16b) indicates, further investment in domestic capital is worthwhile until domestic residents are
just indifferent between the return on this investment and the return from investing the same
amount of resources in risk-free bonds. The corporate tax rate would then be set so as to just
counterbalance the subsidy to domestic ownership of equity in domestic firms. But if Insn < 1,
domestic investment should be cut back yet further since some of the loss from not maximizing
Vn - Kn is shared with nonresident initial owners.
If Insn < 1, then it is also the case that a country can seize a share of the residual claim Vn - Kn
owed to foreigners by imposing a cash-flow tax on the firm, and returning the resulting revenue
not to the firm but to the domestic residents in a lump-sum. 13 As many papers have shown, e.g.
Boadway-Bruce(1984), such a tax has no effect on investment decisions, but raises as revenue a
fraction of the true profits of the firm, which in our notation equal Vn - Kn.
Endogenous foreign investment
So far, each government has been assumed to take as given the amount of capital invested abroad
when it decides on its tax policy. However, whenever asset prices change, the above model suggests
that the amount of capital investment will change, and governments might be expected to foresee
this.14 If they do, the above results change in a variety of ways.
Intuitively, when the government realizes that foreign investment can change, the perceived
supply curve of foreign securities becomes more elastic. Previously, when a country purchased
more foreign securities from some country m, the amount left for nonresidents decreased accordingly
and its price went up. This increase in price, however, should cause foreign firms to invest more,
attenuating the change in the amount of this lottery, 0 m, available to nonresidents, and therefore
lessening the required change in the per unit price of the lottery. In fact, we show below that this
increase in investment can be sufficient to lead the per unit price to fall.
Developing this argument in a general setting results in sufficiently complicated expressions that
we instead examine the special case in which the production function has constant returns to scale,
so that F" = 0, in each country. Here, the investment responsiveness is maximized since there are
13 Mintz(1986) has also pointed out this incentive. While such a tax is nondistorting as of the date imposed, when
anticipated it leads to greater foreign ownership in the firm since domestic residents, already sharing in the random
return to the firm through the lump sum return of the tax revenues, will be less inclined to buy shares privately.
14 Since this response will be more gradual than the response of equity prices to policy changes, forecasting its size
would be far more difficult, however.
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no diminishing returns to inhibit this response. One interpretation of our previous analysis is that
we assumed that F,' = -oo in all countries, so that each firm's optimal capital stock is unchanged
by policy actions.
Now that the amount available of each lottery, 6, can change, it will prove convenient to let
Sg i s iFm represent the number of units purchased of the lottery from firms in country m, and let
Vm Vm/Fm represent the market price per unit of this lottery. Similarly, we define Sn =snFm.
Using this notation, we assume that the government chooses values for C n, rn, and the S! to
maximize the utility of the representative resident, given the effects of policy changes on the prices
Vm.
In order to forecast how policy changes will affect Vm, the government in each country n can
conclude from equation (6b) that
1+amr/(1-rm)
om = - (17)
(1+aamr)F m
Since Fm, is invariant given the constant returns to scale assumption, and since the government
assumes r is given, as are the rm, for m 0 n, the only parameter that can affect Vm is am, which
is a weighted average of the amp for all values of p including n. Note that even am affects Vm only
if Tm $40.
Since changes in C! still have no effect on asset prices, as seen in equation (17), it immediately
follows that the optimal value of to remains zero. However, each government can affect the value of
its domestic firms' assets through rn. As before, the government will wish to restrict the supply of
the domestic security to drive up its price, and in this context will do so by imposing a corporate
income tax. To see this, differentiate the utility of each resident with respect to rn, holding C1n
and the Si fixed, yielding the first-order condition
_n 8V 8Kri ovn(," 9 - -K~ S"-- = 0. (18a)
Bri r 'O"rTn) O
Using the definition of vn and equation (17), this can be re-expressed as
-vn8 Prnanr 8Kn
(Sin - Sni) + = 0. (18b)Or (1 - rn)(1 + anr) =b
In order to learn how much Kn will change, we need to use equation (9a) to solve for how much
foreign purchases of domestic equity change in response to the change in the per unit cost of the
domestic lottery, so how much extra capital must be invested to satisfy this change in demand. We
find that
_K (1+ an,-nr) Ovn
= ---. (18c)
Brn FFB_nvar(6n) Brn
Substituting equation (18c) into equation (18b) and simplifying gives
-r_ (5& - Sn)(1+ ar)F"BMvar( )
1 - rn sanr(1 + a .,_19)
As long as each country is a net supplier of the equity of its domestic firms, we conclude that each
country will choose to impose a positive corporate income tax in order to drive up the price of
domestic equity. Even as the number of countries grows without bound, each country will continue
to use a corporate tax. This is because in the limit, as N grows, we find that
=(S5, - SKF~a(2/s a) (20)
1 -r
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The conditions characterizing the optimal values of the Sn also change considerably. Due to
the change in notation, the first-order conditions become
OM = (1+¢ r)vm + (1+I r)I, (ST, - St.)(ov,/0S;") + bncov(6m, C n). (11a)
P
As before, the second term on the right-hand side describes the effects arising from the market
power of the country, which each individual would ignore. In order to calculate how each of the v,
change, we first need to solve for the changes in the domestic tax rates a,, needed to lead residents
to change Sn, holding everything else fixed. Differentiating the individual's first-order conditions
(4b), we find that
- cov(6, em). (21a)
Given the definition of a ,, we know that Ba,/83 = (BI/bn)8a,,/8Si. Differentiating equation
(17) with respect to a,, and using the above results, gives
OVp - Blnrpcov(Op,eOm)8 - B -co(6,2) .(21b)
8S3n (1+ ar)(1 - ,+ ar)
This equation indicates that purchasing more of a foreign asset, rather than raising its price and
the price of substitute assets as before, now causes these prices to fall - the investment response
of firms more than offsets the change in the amount purchased. This occurs since a cut in the tax
rate domestic residents face on income from foreign equity, inducing them to purchase more foreign
equity, makes it profitable according to equation (17) for foreign firms to invest until asset prices
have been reduced.
When all countries are identical except for the differences in the em, the special case explored
previously, then it is easy to show that ad > 1 and af < 1. When the supply curve of foreign
securities is downward sloping, the government should induce investors to buy more foreign secu-
rities in order to drive down the price, and conversely with respect to domestic securities. As a
result, under these assumptions individual portfolios would be tilted towards ownership of foreign
securities.
Endogenous interest rate
So far, we have assumed that the market interest rate is unaffected by policy changes, and so have
implicitly assumed that aggregate savings is infinitely elastic with respect to the interest rate. This
assumption is clearly unrealistic.15 In contrast, Jones(1967) assumed that the aggregate supply
of capital was fixed when analyzing government policy with respect to capital location. In this
section, we will point out briefly how optimal tax rates would change when market interest rates
are endogenous, but foreign investment rates are again exogenous.
If changes in some policy instrument x can affect market interest rates, then the first-order
conditions with respect to x must include an extra term (OU/Or)(Or/Ox), to reflect the influence
of domestic policy on market interest rates. This effect would be ignored by domestic residents.
Let us therefore begin by examining OBU/Or. Carrying out the differentiation, holding all policy
instruments (Cx., K., and s,") constant but allowing the Vm to respond, we find that
_U OVm C 2
-- = pub, Bi+(1 + r) ((, -sa() y Ee-b i-. (22a)
15 See, for example, Hartman(1984).
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We know from equation (9a) that OV,m/Or = -am,-nVm/(1+ am,-ar) < 0.16 If we assume that
a,,_n = 1, as would be approximately true if N were large, then the sign of 9U/Or equals the sign
of Bin + Em(si - sn)Vm = Win - Cn - Em AKm. Thus, OU/r > 0 if the country is a net
supplier of funds to the world securities market, and conversely.
In order to judge how policy changes would affect market interest rates, a government is assumed
to use equation (9b), which characterizes the market clearing interest rate, conditional on domestic
policy choices. The main way in which the government can affect r is presumably through changing
the amount of domestic savings, or equivalently through changing first-period consumption. Using
equation (9b), we find that Or/OCin = (2 + r)In/2, where Q represents the partial derivative
of the left-hand side of equation (9b) with respect to r, holding all economic behavior constant,
but taking into account the effects of r on the other prices Vm. We assume that n > 0, so that
8r/aCn > 0. This implies that the interest rate must be higher in order for nonresidents to be
willing to consume less in the first period and more in the second period. Therefore, the effect of
first-period consumption on market interest rates makes first-period consumption more attractive
when the country is a net supplier of funds, and less attractive when the country is a net demander
of funds. As a result, tax policy should be used to restrict the absolute size of capital flows.17
Therefore, interest income should be taxed when the country is a net supplier of funds, in order to
make lending less attractive. Similarly, interest income should be subsidized to increase the cost of
borrowing from abroad if the country is a net demander of funds.18
Calculating the effects of either Kn or s! on market interest rates leads to sufficiently compli-
cated expressions that we omit them from the paper. However, these expressions uggest that an
increase in investment, holding own savings constant, would require a rise in interest rates. Sim-
ilarly, if st is increased, nonresidents must be content holding more bonds and less equity which
should require a rise in the interest rate. Therefore, if the country is a net demander (supplier)
of capital, investments in both real capital and in equity are less (more) attractive due to their
effects on market interest rates. Therefore, everything else equal corporate tax rates and tax rates
on equity income should be higher (lower) if the country is a net demander (supplier) of capital.
However, as the number of countries gets large, equation (9b) indicates that each country has
less and less effect on market interest rates. Therefore, these additional complications disappear in
the limit as the number of countries grows.
3. Discussion
In deriving these results, we have used a somewhat specialized model. In particular, we have as-
sumed that individuals have constant absolute risk aversion, that all security returns are distributed
normally, that there are only two periods, and that there is only one physical commodity. Together,
these assumptions allow us to use a standard variant of the CAPM model of securities prices. Each
of these assumptions clearly simplifies the algebra, but we see no reason that these simplifications
should change any of the qualitative conclusions from the model. For example, weakening the
assumption of constant absolute risk aversion will imply that policy changes will in principle affect
the market risk-aversion parameter B. While there are various theoretical results on the sign of
these effects, there is no empirical evidence to our knowledge that any of these effects are important.
Allowing for more than one good introduces incentives on governments to take advantage of any
16 If, in contrast, we assumed that investment rates were endogenous, and production functions were linear, tlhen
this derivative would change sign as well as form.
17 See Jones(1967), Hartman(1985b), and Feldstein-Hartman(1979) for similar results.
18 There could also be an incentive to use government budget deficits (surplases) to reduce the country's net su pply
(demand) of capital. In the above model, however, government fiscal policy would have no real effects.
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market power to affect relative goods prices, raising further complications of a similar sort to those
already analyzed.19
In the results, we found that taxes will be used to reduce the extent of future trade in securities.
But no trade need occur if ownership patterns are initially fully diversified. However, even if there
is full diversification initially, in a more realistic setting the set of firms would not be static - some
existing firms would disappear and some new firms would be created each period. If these new firms
are owned primarily by domestic investors when they go public, and if they have a return pattern
which is not within the span of existing securities, then we again have a setting where securities
will be traded in the future creating an incentive for governments to restrict the amount of this
trade.
Of course, our explanation for the lack of international diversification is only one of several pos-
sibilities. One simple alternative is that purchase of foreign securities involves greater transactions
costs than purchase of domestic securities. This story was developed initially by Black(1974), and
explored further by Stulz(1981).20 However, it is difficult to understand why these costs should be
that large. Transactions costs may seen large simply because these markets in foreign securities are
so thin, making the explanation for thin trade circular.
Another obvious explanation is tax evasion. Whether foreign investments succeed in avoiding
taxes, however, depends on the institutional form they take. If direct foreign investment by indi-
viduals cannot be monitored by the tax authorities, and is therefore restricted, then there should
be strong economic pressure for substitutes to arise which are effectively taxable. Investment by
corporate subsidiaries would be one example, while investments handled through domestic financial
intermediaries, which can be monitored by the tax authorities, would be another. Restrictions by
the tax authorities should change the form but not the amount of international diversification.
A third, and perhaps important explanation, would be fear of expropriation of foreign invest-
ments by the local government. If the probability of expropriation depends on the amount of foreign
investment, then not only is there a reduction in the equilibrium amount of foreign investment under
competition, but in addition, each new investor in a foreign country imposes a negative externality
on previous investors by raising the probability of expropriation. Therefore, each government has
the incentive to internalize this externality by further discouraging foreign investments. However,
each government would also face the incentive to promise credibly that it will not expropriate for-
eign investments, so expropriation should occur only to the degree that these promises cannot be
made binding, and even then reputation effects may inhibit expropriation.21
Yet another explanation for lack of international diversification is that governments choose
various restrictive measures, including tax policy, so as to manipulate exchange rate movements.
Formally speaking, this sort of intervention can be analyzed using the same sort of techniques we
have used in this paper. One needs a model of exchange rate determination and a model of the
government's objective function. Given these two pieces, one can set up the optimal tax problem
and examine the Nash equilibrium in tax policies, just as we have done here.
A number of other explanations are certainly possible, including informational asymmetries
between investors in different countries, government incentives created by the strategic interactions
between firms from different countries, etc. The point of this paper has simply been to explore the
19 For a related argument concerning the incentives a country faces when it can influence real exchange rates, in a
model without uncertainty, see Gordon(1985).
20 In Black's paper, there was an extra transactions savings on short sales of foreign securities, leading to peculiar
patterns of ownership. In Stulz, short sales of foreign securities also involved extra transactions costs, leading to
more conventional results.
21 However, to the extent that the probability of expropriation is exogenous, then this threat encourages foreign
ownership on risk-sharing grounds, as argued in footnote 11.
13
implications of one possible story.
4. Conclusions
This paper has shown that whenever a country is not a price-taker in the international securities
market, then it has an incentive to design its tax policy so as to restrict international trade in these
securities. For example, as a number of writers have argued, if a country can affect the prevailing
market interest rate through its net demand or supply of funds, then it has an incentive to restrict
the size of this net demand or supply. In fact, Summers(1985) has argued that governments do
indeed use their fiscal policies to restrict their net demand or supply of funds, or equivalently to
restrict the difference between their savings rate and their investment rate. This use of market
power may therefore provide one explanation for the observation by Feldstein-Horioka(1980) that
among the O.E.C.D. countries, the difference between a country's savings rate and investment rate
tends to be small.2 2 We show, however, that this incentive to restrict the net flow of funds is smaller
for smaller countries. Indeed the evidence reported in both Summers(1985) and Obstfeld(1985) is
that the savings and investment rates for smaller countries are much less closely tied than are those
for larger countries.
In addition, we show that each country faces the incentive to restrict the amount of equity in its
domestic firms owned by foreigners and the amount of equity in foreign firms owned by domestic
residents. It can do so both by imposing a corporate tax on its domestic firms, to restrict the total
supply of their equity, and by imposing a set of taxes on the income its residents receive from equity,
to induce them to concentrate their portfolios in domestic equity.23 This use of market power may
therefore also help explain the very limited degree of international diversification that is observed
empirically.
More surprisingly, we show that even small countries have the incentive to restrict the supply
of domestic equity available to foreigners, both by reducing the total supply of domestic equity
through a corporate income tax and also by reducing the fraction of this total supply available
to foreigners by inducing domestic residents to concentrate their portfolios in domestic equity.
These results on the design of tax policy in a small open economy are in sharp contrast to those
in Gordon(1986), who examined optimal tax policies in a similar model but without uncertainty.
Without uncertainty, small countries are price-takers and should not distort corporate investment
decisions or individual portfolio decisions even when other sources of tax revenue impose efficiency
costs.
As in models of tariff policy, we find that each country, acting in isolation, faces an incentive
to distort the allocation of resources (and of risk-bearing) in order to take advantage of its market
power. The net result may well be a loss in utility in all countries - if all countries are identical
(except for the risk characteristics of domestic production), this is certainly the case. Just as binding
agreements to avoid using tariffs (such as GATT) should raise the efficiency of the allocation of
resources, binding agreements on tax policy should also be attractive. Unlike the case of tariffs,
however, governments normally wish to tax savings and investment independently of attempts to
exploit market power in international securities markets. Therefore, formulating an agreement
which prevents governments from taking advantage of their market power in the financial securities
22 The model does not provide support, however, for the inference by Feldstein--Korioka that extra domestic savings
leads to essentially the same amount of extra dornestic investrnent. Given our assumption of constant absolute risk
aversion, at the margin any extra savings in a country, holding its tax policy constant, is used to buy risk-free bonds,
and so results in a drop in the world interest rate and an equivalent expansion in investment in all countries.
23 This last result can change if the amount of capital investmnent by firms is sufficiently elastic with respect to the
market value of its equity.
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markets and yet which leaves them adequate flexibility in the design of domestic tax policy may
be very difficult.
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Footnotes
1. The most obvious example of such export restrictions is OPEC.
2. See, for example, Jones(1967), Gehrels(1971), Feldstein-Hartman(1979), or Hartman(1985ab),
for further discussion. When a country has market power in both the capital market and the
commodity market, as in Jones and Gehrels, interaction effects add complications.
3. Helpman-Razin(1978,pp. 141-2) noted in this setting the possible gains from government inter-
vention.
4. See Booth(1987) for estimates of the degree to which the dividend tax credit concentrates
ownership of Canadian securities among Canadian investors.
5. Adler-Dumas(1983) show empirically that, even taking exchange rate risk into account, the
mean-variance efficient portfolio for an investor can be approximated by a combination of nominally
risk-free domestic bonds and a share of the world portfolio in equity.
6. We therefore assume purchasing power parity. For a related discussion of use of government
policy to take advantage of market power with respect to exchange rates, see Gordon(1985).
7. For simplicity, we assume that real and not nominal interest is taxable. If nominal interest were
taxable at different rates in different countries, there must be differences in the after-tax return
on different bonds in equilibrium, creating arbitrage possibilities. No such possibilities exist when
real interest is taxable. These arbitrage possibilities could also have been avoided by making all
exchange rate gains or losses fully taxable. See Gordon(1986) for further discussion.
8. Existing tax structures do not normally differentiate directly between income from foreign and
domestic securities. However, a number of countries impose a dividend withholding tax on dividends
from domestic firms paid to foreigners. If Rm is defined to equal what foreigners receive on equity,
then a withholding tax is equivalent to a subsidy on ownership of domestic equity. Similarly, a
number of countries have a dividend credit which is available only to domestic residents on equity
of domestic firms. The ability of governments to differentiate between income from different foreign
countries is assumed to simplify the notation in the following discussion.
9. These assumptions correspond to those used by Stiglitz(1972) and Jensen-Long(1972) in ana-
lyzing the behavior of a firm which is not a price-taker in the securities market.
10. Under our assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, any change in savings due to a change
in C! is entirely allocated to B1,, so there is no resulting change in any of the Vm.
11. This simplifying assumption of independent shocks across countries, while extreme, is not that
inconsistent with the data as reported in Adler-Dumas(1983). The results being derived depend
almost entirely on the size of the idiosyncratic shocks, and adding common shocks holding constant
the size of the idiosyncratic shocks has almost no effect.
12. These approximations will be very good for large N.
13. Mintz(1986) has also pointed out this incentive. While such a tax is nondistorting as of the
date imposed, when anticipated it leads to greater foreign ownership in the firm since domestic
residents, already sharing in the random return to the firm through the lump sum return of the
tax revenues, will be less inclined to buy shares privately.
14. Since this response will be more gradual than the response of equity prices to policy changes,
forecasting its size would be far more difficult, however.
15. See, for example, Hartman(1984).
16. If, in contrast, we assumed that investment rates were endogenous, and production functions
were linear, then this derivative would change sign as well as form.
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17. See Jones(1967), Hartman(1985b), and Feldstein-Hartman(1979) for similar results.
18. There could also be an incentive to use government budget deficits (surpluses) to reduce the
country's net supply (demand) of capital. In the above model, however, government fiscal policy
would have no real effects.
19. For a related argument concerning the incentives a country faces when it can influence real
exchange rates, in a model without uncertainty, see Gordon(1985).
20. In Black's paper, there was an extra transactions savings on short sales of foreign securities,
leading to peculiar patterns of ownership. In Stulz, short sales of foreign securities also involved
extra transactions costs, leading to more conventional results.
21. However, to the extent that the probability of expropriation is exogenous, then this threat
encourages foreign ownership on risk-sharing grounds, as argued in footnote 11.
22. The model does not provide support, however, for the inference by Feldstein-Horioka that
extra domestic savings leads to essentially the same amount of extra domestic investment. Given
our assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, at the margin any extra savings in a country,
holding its tax policy constant, is used to buy risk-free bonds, and so results in a drop in the world
interest rate and an equivalent expansion in investment in all countries.
23. This last result can change if the amount of capital investment by firms is sufficiently elastic
with respect to the market value of its equity.
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